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Abstract. Existing research shows that the ideas of judges matter for judicial behavior both on 
the bench (decision making) and off the bench (lobbying and mobilization for institutional 
change). Yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the content and distribution of these 
ideas and even less evidence and fewer theoretical propositions regarding the manner in which 
ideas transfer or diffuse among judges. Addressing these empirical and theoretical gaps, I survey 
judges in the Mexican state of Michoacán and apply techniques of network analysis. The project 
makes four main contributions: (1) original data on the attitudes of judges regarding prominent 
institutional and jurisprudential changes shaping the legal landscape in Mexico; (2) egocentric 
data on network structure for the sampled judges; (3) sociocentric data on network structure at 
the level of judicial district, state supreme court, and entire state generated by aggregating the 
egocentric data; and (4) a mixed-methods analysis of the causal relationship between network 
features and judicial attitudes, drawing on egocentric methods, sociocentric methods, and 
personal interviews with focal individuals. Complementing literatures on political socialization, 
policy diffusion, and complex systems, the analysis clarifies our understanding of the role of 
judicial networks in strengthening democracy and the rule of law. 
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Introduction 
Effective courts are widely regarded as vital to both democracy and development (O‘Donnell 
2001; UNDP 2004), and existing research in both judicial decision making and institutional 
change highlights the role of institutional insiders (judges) and their ideas in shaping key legal 
and judicial outcomes (Couso 2010; Hilbink 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2012; Woods 2008, 2009; 
Woods and Hilbink 2009; Couso and Hilbink 2011; Rodríguez-Garavito 2011). That is, judges 
play pivotal roles in either helping or hindering processes of legal change depending on their 
attitudes towards that change. 
Yet, despite the importance of judges‘ ideas for key judicial outcomes, we know very 
little about the content and distribution of these ideas, especially outside the United States, and 
even less about how these ideas transfer or diffuse among judges. How do ideas spread among 
judges? Why do different attitudes regarding institutional design, jurisprudence, and other forms 
of legal change diffuse among legal elites? Addressing these empirical and theoretical gaps, I 
conduct a network analysis of the diffusion of ideas among all judges in the Mexican state of 
Michoacán. Building on recent network analyses of the law (Fowler et al. 2007; Katz et al. 2011; 
Lupu and Voeten 2012), the project makes four main contributions: (1) original data on the 
attitudes of judges regarding prominent institutional and jurisprudential changes shaping the 
legal landscape in Mexico; (2) egocentric network data for the individual judges; (3) sociocentric 
network data for the whole state generated by aggregating the egocentric data; and (4) an 
analysis of the causal relationship between network structure and judicial attitudes. Indeed, the 
local level of analysis increases analytic leverage in the study of network dynamics (Sokhey and 
Djupe 2011) and also contributes to growing literatures on subnational politics (Snyder 2001; 
Beer 2003; Chavez 2004). Complementing literatures on political socialization, policy diffusion, 
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and complex systems, I find a relationship between the social structure among judges and their 
attitudes, i.e., ―networked justice.‖ Given the vital role of judges and their ideas in shaping 
institutional design, jurisprudence, and other legal changes, a better understanding of this 
phenomenon clarifies the role of judges in strengthening democracy and the rule of law. 
Looking ahead, I first motivate the emphasis on judicial networks by highlighting (1) the 
emphasis existing research places on the role of ideas in explaining key judicial outcomes and 
(2) how a network perspective can be harnessed to examine the origin and spread of these ideas. 
The following section introduces the reader to the landscape of legal change in Mexico, 
emphasizing the extent to which patterns seen in Mexico are illustrative of patterns seen 
elsewhere in the region and in other parts of the world. Subsequently, the fourth section outlines 
working hypotheses, and in the fifth section I present the data and introduce the sequence of 
methods. Notably, the egocentric, sociocentric, and qualitative portions of the analysis require 
different methods, and the approach to each of these phases is outlined separately in this section. 
The empirical analysis is concentrated in the sixth and seventh sections: the first part of the sixth 
section examines the egocentric data, and the second part analyzes the sociocentric data 
generated by aggregating the egocentric data; the seventh (and penultimate) section offers 
qualitative evidence from personal interviews with focal individuals. This mixed-methods 
approach draws on several streams of evidence and techniques, engaging in a process of data- 
and method-triangulation to maximize the validity of conclusions (Denzin 1978; Tarrow 1995).  
Overall, I find consistent and robust evidence that social structure influences judicial 
attitudes. This is evident in the two different statistical approaches required to examine 
egocentric and sociocentric data, and in the qualitative component, as well. That is, the legal 
attitudes judges hold are shaped by those with whom they interact. In short, whom they know 
 3 
 
shapes what they know. I conclude with a discussion of broader implications and future research. 
Why Judicial Networks? 
Ideas are a powerful predictor of judicial decisions and institutional change. Similarly, network 
analysis is a powerful tool to examine ideas and how these transfer among relevant actors. 
In decision making—judicial behavior on the bench—attitudes, values, and ideology play 
a critical role in determining the willingness of judges to review particular cases, to address 
certain issues, and in determining the final outcome of cases. The US literature holds ample 
evidence of this phenomenon, perhaps most dramatically in the emphasis on political ideology in 
the ―attitudinal model‖ of decision making (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002), also called ―ideological 
voting‖ (Sunstein et al. 2004, 2006). Scholars of comparative judicial politics are increasingly 
finding similar results.
2
 Indeed, the comparative literature is moving beyond the US focus on 
political ideology, understood as an actor‘s placement along a conventional left–right continuum, 
to address other kinds of ideational variation among judges, including ―judicial role conception‖ 
(Hilbink forthcoming 2012), understood as a judge‘s view of the appropriateness of challenging 
actions by dominant political actors (see also Couso 2010; Couso and Hilbink 2011).  
In addition to shaping judicial decision making, ideational factors also motivate and 
shape the behavior of judges off the bench—activities of judges for and against institutional 
reforms. Evidence from the United States includes ideologically progressive, rights-oriented 
expansion and contraction of the judicial agenda (Epp 1998) and court jurisdiction (Gillman 
2002, 2008). Comparative evidence includes variants of similar movements in Canada, Britain, 
                                                          
2
 Evidence includes studies in Brazil (Engelmann 2004; Desposato, Ingram, and Lannes 2011; see also Kapiszewski 
2011, though she finds pragmatic considerations outweigh the influence of ideology), Chile (Hilbink 2007a, 
speaking of ―institutional ideology‖), Mexico (Sanchez, Magaloni, and Magar 2011), Colombia (Nunes 2010), and 
Portugal (Amaral-Garcia et al. 2009). 
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and India (Epp 1998), neoliberal judicial elites in Israel, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand 
(Hirschl 2000, 2004), and progressive judges in Spain (Hilbink 2007b), Israel (Woods 2008), 
Mexico (Ingram 2012b), and Brazil (Engelmann 2004; 2007). In sum, institutional insiders 
(judges) and their subjective, nonmaterial commitments play an important role in explaining 
crucial judicial outcomes. Judges can either help or hinder institutional design, jurisprudence, 
and other forms of legal change depending on their attitudes towards said change.  
Given the importance of judges and their ideas, the natural next move would be to 
consider what these ideas are and how one judge comes to hold them while another does not—
where do ideas come from? Yet, while we know the ideas of judges matter, there is little 
empirical evidence regarding the content and distribution of these ideas and even less evidence 
regarding the how these ideas transfer or diffuse among judges. 
 First, we know very little about the content and distribution of judicial attitudes, 
especially outside the United States. That is, we know ideas matter and have a general sense of 
the kinds of ideas that matter, but little research to date has sought to systematically examine 
judges‘ attitudes about a range of institutional and jurisprudential issues.3  In part, this empirical 
gap is due to a degree of vagueness in the term ―ideas,‖ or what social movement scholars refer 
to as the ―ephemeral, amorphous nature of the subject matter‖ (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 
1996, 6, referring to the ideational framing process). To be clear, current research does 
operationalize attitudinal orientations among judges.
4
 While existing metrics offer valuable and 
                                                          
3
 Ingram, Rodriguez Ferreira, and Shirk (2011) survey judges, prosecutors, and public defenders' attitudes towards 
legal reforms in nine Mexican states. 
4
 For instance, several projects measure judicial ideology as a categorical variable capturing party affiliation and, 
therefore, ideology as the party of the appointing executive (e.g., Sunstein et al. 2004, 2006). In the United States, 
Segal-Cover scores improve on this method by examining newspaper editorials for each Supreme Court nominee 
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increasingly sophisticated contributions, they seek to place judges on a conventional left–right 
ideological spectrum, and some, like the Martin-Quinn scores, rely on revealed preferences from 
behavior that may be highly strategic, in which case these measures may not coincide with 
sincere preferences. Further, these metrics do not ask judges themselves about their attitudes. 
Here, I conceptualize ideas specifically as attitudes towards existing legal reforms (e.g., the 
creation of judicial councils) and styles of decision making (e.g., whether lower-court judges 
should always have to defer to the decisions of higher courts). The survey questionnaire captures 
a wide range of attitudes regarding these institutional and jurisprudential topics and relies on 
judges‘ self reports to identify their attitudes. 
Second, we know even less about how these attitudes transfer or diffuse among judges. 
The overwhelming majority of research treats judicial attitudes as an explanatory variable in a 
broad endeavor to understand the consequences of these attitudes for judicial behavior. Where 
attitudes do become an outcome of interest, studies tend to focus on static attributes or 
characteristics of actors as being the principal forces that shape ideas. Ideational profiles are 
understood as the product of an individual‘s features, e.g., socioeconomic status. This may in 
fact be what is taking place. However, network analysis suggests that individual characteristics 
are only part of the story and that an individual‘s social relations and interactions with other 
individuals may account for a larger part of the origin of a judge's ideational profile. Indeed, 
these relational dynamics may be most of the story. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and coding paragraphs as either liberal or conservative, yielding an index (–1 to 1) for ideology (Segal and Cover 
1989; Segal and Spaeth 2002). More recently, Martin-Quinn scores draw on techniques developed for legislative 
roll-call analysis to generate estimates of judicial ideal points based on the actual votes of judges (Martin and Quinn 
2002, 2007). Following the Martin-Quinn example, Desposato, Ingram, and Lannes (2011) estimate ideal points for 
justices on Brazil‘s constitutional court. 
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To be clear, attention to relational sources of legal change and law reform networks is not 
new. Indeed, the idea of social networks and their influence is implicit in much social movement 
literature, including the legal mobilization scholarship in the United States and abroad (McCann 
1994; Epp 1998; Hilbink 2007b; Woods 2008). For instance, Woods explains the emergence of 
―consensus around norms‖ (2008, 23) as the result of sustained interaction within relatively 
diffuse ―judicial communities‖—groups of judges who also share similar demographic 
characteristics such as education and professional trajectory. However, the treatment of network 
concepts is informal in the research cited above.
5
 Even where the notion of networks and 
diffusion effects are referenced more explicitly, network concepts remain largely informal (e.g., 
Langer 2007; Rodríguez-Garavito 2011; Ingram 2012b).  
More recently, a small number of scholars have framed the explanation of the diffusion 
of legal ideas in explicitly structural, network analytic terms, harnessing a fuller set of 
conceptual, measurement, and analytic techniques for the study of judicial networks. Fowler et 
al. (2007) and Fowler and Jeon (2008) examine citation networks of US Supreme Court 
precedents, identifying the most central or influential cases. Similarly, Lupu and Voeten (2012) 
examine the citation networks of the European Court of Human Rights. In international relations, 
Fariss and Schnakenberg (2009) apply network analysis to the study of human rights regimes and 
the incidence of torture. Back in the United States, Katz and Stafford (2010) use law clerks to 
proxy relations among US federal judges, constructing a network of the connectedness of the 
federal judiciary and operationalizing judicial authority or power according to the structural 
location of actors in this network. Closely related to the present study of ideational contagion 
                                                          
5
 For instance, a ―justice network‖ (red de justicia) might be a group of interested individuals or an informal 
association of groups, not a formal, structural representation of a network. 
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among judges, Katz et al. (2011) examine the ―infectiousness of ideas‖ among the professoriate 
in 184 ABA-accredited law schools in the United States. Using measures of network centrality, 
they conclude that law schools that send more of their graduates to tenure-track positions at other 
law schools become ―hubs‖ of legal influence, establishing the hierarchical structure of legal 
education. The architecture of these relations serves as the conduit for diffusing legal ideas, 
much as I propose judges' relational architecture shapes the diffusion of ideas regarding reform.  
Network analysis also has some methodological advantages for examining the diffusion 
of ideas. For instance, conventional data sets and statistical techniques view units as independent 
of each other. That is, judges‘ attitudes are seen as a function of their own individual attributes 
(e.g., age, sex, education, income), and perhaps some contextual events (e.g., financial crisis), 
but not as a function of their colleagues‘ attitudes, which would violate the independence 
assumption underlying most analyses. Thus, the adoption of a new idea is fundamentally 
understood as an individualistic or atomistic phenomenon, based on the properties, features, or 
attributes of the individual. Conversely, a network perspective conceptualizes units of analysis as 
interpendent; judicial attitudes may be shaped in part by individual attributes, but they are also a 
function of the attitudes of other judges. One‘s attitude is explicitly dependent on the attitude of 
one‘s neighbors! Echoing Woods and earlier social movement theory, ideas spread among 
individuals who are in ―intense regular contact with each other‖ (Ferree and Miller 1977, 34; 
cited in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 9). Thus, a long line of research applies network 
analysis to problems and puzzles of diffusion, contagion, and innovation, finding that ―an 
individual‘s direct contacts influence his or her decision to adopt or not adopt an innovation‖ 
(Valente 1995, 31). 
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Judicial Reform Networks in Mexico 
Mexico offers a rich environment in which to study justice reform networks. Historically 
suffering from weak and dysfunctional courts (see, e.g., Cumaraswamy 2002), in the last twenty 
years—through a slow political opening starting in 1977 and after a transition to democracy in 
2000—Mexico has advanced several high-profile reforms to address the widely recognized 
weakness of justice institutions. The two most prominent reforms target judicial councils and 
criminal procedure. First, a national reform in 1994 reshaped the supreme court and created a 
federal judicial council (Fix-Zamudio and Fix-Fierro 1996; Fix-Fierro 2003, 2004; Finkel 2008). 
Mexico‘s thirty-two states were supposed to follow suit, but there was no explicit directive to do 
so. Second, following regional developments in criminal law (Langer 2007), a 2008 criminal 
procedure reform has revolutionized the way Mexican judges think about criminal procedure and 
due process, transitioning from an inquisitorial process traditionally associated with civil law 
systems to an adversarial process associated with common law systems (Ingram and Shirk 2010). 
This time, the federal reform mandated that all thirty-two states (including the federal district of 
Mexico City) adopt local versions of the new criminal procedure by 2016. Both reforms have 
filtered through the states in a highly uneven pattern (Ingram 2012a, 2012b). 
Beyond critical reforms that deserve attention for their substantive importance, (Ingram 
2012b) offers qualitative evidence of judges who act as reform entrepreneurs or agents of 
socialization, constituting the kind of justice reform networks the present study seeks to 
formalize in a more systematic manner. For instance, a group of judges from the state of 
Michoacán formed a close-knit group that promoted the judicial council reform in that state from 
2002 onwards, and members of this group have since also promoted the criminal procedure 
reform. The judicial council reform was ultimately passed in 2005, and on January 13, 2012, the 
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state passed the vital new code of criminal procedure. Several members of this group, led by 
state supreme court judge Alejandro González Gómez and state electoral judge Jaime del Rio, 
studied law together in Spain at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and were influenced by 
the teachings and experiences of progressive judges who lived through Spain‘s transition from 
Franco‘s dictatorship to democracy in the late 1970s and 1980s, including the ―Democratic 
Justice‖ movement examined by Hilbink (2007b). Further, judges like Alejandro González also 
had academic careers—either before joining the bench or after—and interviews conducted in 
2008 and 2012 showed that exposure to these individuals‘ academic and professional presence 
influenced colleagues and newer generations of legal professionals.  
On case selection, Michoacán is a good case for both methodological and non-
methodological reasons. First, early on there were fair questions about the feasibility of this kind 
of project. A network approach to ideational diffusion among judges is novel, and it was 
reasonable to expect that judges might not be willing to answer questions about their relational 
structure, so the ability to generate original data for the project at first seemed unlikely, 
especially in a less developed country facing serious challenges in public safety and security. 
Thus, it made sense to start somewhere where prior work indicated at least some form of 
network influence, even if informally. My own prior research provided this with regard to the 
group of judges that formed around Alejandro González and Jaime Del Rio. Thus, the research 
design returns to a site of prior research for a more systematic examination of how relations 
among judges shape their ideas. Further, given the breadth and depth of legal reforms being 
pursued in Mexico, the country offers a rich environment in which to study the diffusion of ideas 
among judges that might help or hinder such a process. However, as in many larger federal 
systems, the implementation of many reforms in Mexico—including the judicial council and 
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criminal procedure reforms—are left to the states. Many states have not promoted these reforms, 
while others have advanced far. In this regard, a good state in which to conduct this research is 
one in which there is some evidence of variation in the attitudes of judges towards these reforms. 
Again, Michoacán provides this variation to a much greater degree than other states. For 
instance, the judicial council reform of 2005 was a highly contested process, due in part to a deep 
division among judges regarding the composition and powers of the council. Lastly, 
methodological reasons justify the focus on diffusion within a single state or geographic region. 
As noted by a recent review of network research, ―instead of worrying about national 
representativeness, progress may come from in-depth study in smaller settings‖ (Sokhey and 
Djupe 2011, 58). 
 
Hypotheses 
The discussion above leads to the general expectation that judges who interact more intensely, 
more frequently, and are otherwise more ―connected‖ within their profession and legal 
community will share similar normative outlooks about legal and institutional change. These 
judges and their connections constitute what I call ―justice reform networks.‖ By understanding 
the relational sources of judges‘ ideas, we can understand the social origins of strong courts, or 
―networked justice.‖  
Specifically, I expect to find evidence showing: (1) variation in the content of judges‘ 
opinions regarding a variety of recent and ongoing reforms; (2) variation in the structure of 
relations among judges; and (3) a causal relationships between the structure of judges‘ relations 
on their opinions about justice reforms. That is, whom judges know affects what they know. I 
anticipate the following working hypotheses. 
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H1a: In ego networks, attitude towards reform should vary positively with network size and 
density.  
H1b: In whole networks, attitude towards reform should vary positively with how “central” 
one’s social location is in the whole network.  
H2: Attitude towards reform should vary positively with the attitude(s) of network neighbor(s). 
H3: Hypothesis 2 should be conditioned by the strength of relations among network neighbors. 
 
Regarding H1a and H1b, measures of network size and density, as well as various 
measures of network centrality, draw on existing literature. Network size is simply the number of 
alters in any ego network, and network density captures the number of existing ties as a 
proportion of the total possible ties. Network centrality can be unpacked into at least four distinct 
forms of centrality: degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality 
is the total number of ties for each node. Degree centrality is therefore analogous to network size, 
except that in the ego network analysis the range is one to five (1–5), whereas in the sociocentric 
analysis the range is much larger. Betweenness centrality captures the extent to which a node is 
on the shortest path between two other nodes. Nodes with high values on this measure are often 
thought of as being good conduits, bridges, brokers, or gatekeepers between other nodes. 
Because more information should flow through these nodes than others with lower values, these 
nodes are exposed to more information and should therefore adopt new ideas and attitudes faster 
or sooner than others. Closeness centrality captures the ease with which a node can reach all 
other nodes in the network. High values on any of these measures indicate that the individual is 
―more likely to receive information and influence‖ (Valente 1995, 53). Therefore, these 
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measures should be associated with ―innovativeness‖ or in the case of ideational diffusion, the 
adoption of new ideas. 
 
Methods and Data 
Network Analysis  
The network perspective requires a shift from focusing on the attributes of independent units to a 
focus on the relational ties among these units, rendering the structure of data explicitly 
dependent. This analytic shift has implications for descriptive and causal analysis.  
Networks are usually studied as either (1) whole networks (also called ―sociocentric‖), or 
(2) personal or ―ego‖ networks (also called ―egocentric‖). In whole networks, a boundary 
establishes the outer perimeter of the network (e.g., a classroom), and information must be 
collected on every single member within that perimeter (e.g., every student in class) and on the 
ties between that member and every other member. Personal networks examine one individual 
(the ―ego‖) and the quantity and quality of relations with others (―alters‖), and egos can be 
sampled from a broader population (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005; 
see Appendix A for discussion of strengths and weakness of each approach). 
No single method is perfect, so relying on a multi-method approach leverages the 
―diversity of imperfections‖ (Brewer and Hunter 1989, 16–17; also Tashakkori and Teddlie 
1998, 40–42) to strengthen the validity of conclusions. To this end, I employ a mixed-methods 
strategy in two ways: (1) in the combination of ego (egocentric) and whole (sociocentric) 
network data and analysis; and (2) in the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. 
First, I examine only the egocentric data. Since each ego network is sampled independently of 
the others, these data can be studied with standard regression techniques that treat each 
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observation as independent. Given the ordinal nature of the response variable, an ordered 
probabilistic regression model is applied. Second, I aggregate the egocentric data to form 
sociocentric networks, thereby drawing on the strengths of each type of data to offset their 
weaknesses in Appendix A. 
The quantitative analysis of network influence in sociocentric networks focuses on two 
approaches: (1) network disturbance models, and (2) network effects models. Network 
disturbance models (Dow 1979, 1984; Dow et al. 1982) derived from geographic, spatial analysis 
have been popular for several decades. However, Leenders (2002) and Dow (2007, 346) 
highlight that autocorrelation in the error (i.e., disturbance) term can be due to at least three 
different sources: incorrect model specification (e.g., linear vs. nonlinear), omitted variable(s), or 
adjustment to perceived values in an ego‘s social context. It is only this last influence that is 
properly a network influence. Even here, however, the model conceptualizes influence more as 
reaction than interaction (Leenders 2002, cited in Dow 2007, 346). For this reason, Dow (2007, 
346) notes that the network effects model may be more appropriate than the network disturbance 
model, though extensions including both types of influence are also possible (e.g., Dow 2007, 
344; Butts 2008, 39).
6
 
Given the ordinal response variable and following Dow (2007, 2008), I employ a two-
stage, conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) network autocorrelation effects model. 
Equations (1) and (2) represent the initial structural model in matrix notation: 
 
                                                          
6
 In R, the ―lnam‖ function in the ―sna‖ package allows the specification of two weight matrices, W1 and W2, where 
W1 is a vector of autoregressive (AR) or network effects parameters, and W2 is a vector of moving average (MA) or 
network disturbance parameters (Butts 2008).  
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y = ρWy + X1β1 + ɛ (1) 
  
Wy = X2β2 + ν (2) 
  
where y is a N x 1 vector of the ordinal outcome of interest, W is a square N x N weights matrix 
that specifies the presence (binary matrix; hereafter referred to as W1) or strength (valued 
matrix, referred to as W2) of relations among all dyads of judges; X is an N x k matrix of 
explanatory variables, ɛ and ν are vectors of error terms, and ρ and β are vectors of regression 
coefficients. Thus, Wy captures the multiplication between W and y that yields a vector of the 
weighted average of the quantity y among an individual‘s social relations. Equations (1) and (2) 
reduce to equation (3) below,  
 
y = ρWy + X1β1 + λν + η (3) 
  
where η = ɛ - λν. Regressing Wy on instrumental variables7 yields residuals ν, which can be 
plugged into Equation (3) (see Dow 2008 for detailed discussion of method). 
Lastly, the research design combines these two forms of quantitative network analysis 
(personal and whole) with in-depth, qualitative network analysis. Following Hollstein (2011), I 
sequence the qualitative phase of work after the quantitative phase, selecting five judges for 
                                                          
7
 Dow notes that the ―ideal set of instruments for the spatial (and thus also network) effects model are the linear 
combinations of the exogenous variables X1 [in equation 1] and powers of the network weights matrix (Dow 2008, 
402, citing Kelejian and Prucha 1998; see also Dow 2008, fn. 8). I use linear combinations of W and the exogenous 
variables sex, position, and judicial district. On use of instruments in network regressions, see also Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1987; 1993). 
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personal, semi-structured interviews using qualitative network techniques. The triangulation of 
data and methods inherent in the combination of methods enhances the validity of both the 
measures and the final conclusions regarding causation (Hollstein 2011; see also Padgett in 
Fowler et al. 2011). 
Data 
A survey of judges in the Mexican state of Michoacán generated original data for this study. The 
state has a total of 110 judges, including first-instance jueces and second-instance magistrados. 
Of this total, a primary effort of telephonic contacts sought a full census of these judges but 
obtained eighty-five responses. A follow-up effort via email obtained an additional five 
responses, yielding a total of ninety completed questionnaires, for a response rate of 81.82 
percent.
8
 Once the initial data analysis was complete, personal interviews with five focal 
individuals were conducted in the state capital, Morelia, in January 2012. 
The survey instrument consists of three batteries: (1) opinion, (2) ―name generator,‖ and 
(3) ―name interpreter.‖ Opinion questions register the attitudes of the respondent (ego) towards a 
series of recent and ongoing legal and institutional reforms, asking egos to gauge the degree to 
which they agree with a statement, following a Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). For instance, sample questions include statements such as ―the reform that created the 
judicial council was a good idea‖ and ―lower court judges can diverge from the decisions of 
higher courts.‖ In the second battery, ―name generator‖ questions ask egos to identify up to ten 
                                                          
8
 The polling firm Data Opinión Pública y Mercados (DataOPM), based in Mexico City, conducted the telephonic 
interviews in June and July 2011. At DataOPM, Pablo Parás and Carlos López managed the survey administration, 
and both have conducted previous surveys in the justice sector in Mexico. I am grateful to them both and to their 
staff for valuable feedback on early drafts of the questionnaire and for communications during the survey 
administration that enhanced its feasibility and interpretation.  
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people with whom they ―discuss important matters relating to legal and judicial reforms.‖ This 
phrasing is borrowed from established surveys that seek to identify the individuals with whom 
the ego most interacts on particular subject matters (e.g., network batteries in the United States 
from General Social Survey, GSS, or American National Election Studies, ANES). Egos also 
identify how ―close‖ they feel to each alter, providing a metric for tie strength. Lastly, 
respondents are asked to focus on the first five names they provided, and ―name interpreter‖ 
questions ask egos a series of questions about each of these five alters.
9
 Name interpreter 
questions include those that ask ego to estimate how each alter would respond to each of the 
opinion questions asked previously of ego, whether the alters know each other, and how close 
alters are to each other. These answers provide a sense of the attitudinal orientation of alters, 
network structure, and tie strength among alters.  
The survey yields two types of network data: egocentric and sociocentric. Variables 
capturing network structure include degree (i.e., size), density, and average tie strength. Degree 
captures the general connectedness of the ego, with higher values indicating greater integration 
into the society of judges. Density captures the number of ties among alters as a proportion of the 
total number of possible ties among them, measuring the extent to which an ego‘s alters know 
and communicate with each other. Higher numbers indicate more connectivity within the 
personal network (Valente 1995, 40).
10
 Tie strength was measured by asking respondents how 
close they were to each alter and how close each of the alters were to each other (cercanía). 
Closeness, along with UCINET‘s output for network density, are useful measures of the 
                                                          
9
 Burt (1984) considered the number of alters for the network battery included in the US General Social Survey 
(GSS); he suggested three as a minimum number, and ultimately decided on five, citing evidence that people can 
only hold five to seven significant ―data chunks‖ in their head at any one time (citing Miller 1956; Simon 1974). 
10
 High density may also impede the entrance of new ideas (Danowski 1986, cited in Valente 1995, 40). 
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cohesiveness of each ego network (Hanneman and Riddle 2005, chap. 8).
11
 Following Betsy 
Sinclair‘s advice in Fowler et al. (2011), additional variables must control for homophily and 
confounders that might be ascribed to context. Homophily is the similarity between nodes on 
individual attributes that might cause these individuals to have the attitude of interest. Thus, 
control variables include age, progressiveness, ideological orientation, highest level of education, 
income, professional position, and judicial district. Regarding age, there is reason to expect that 
younger judges may be more open to institutional and jurisprudential changes. Interview 
evidence suggests judicial elders are resistant to legal change because these changes tend to 
require a new way of performing their job, something they are disinclined to do late in their 
careers. Therefore, I expect age to be negatively related to attitude. Further, the dummy variable 
for position distinguishes first- from second-instance, appellate judges (1 if second-instance 
                                                          
11
 UCINET generates additional measures of network structure, but they are omitted here for various reasons. Of 
these other measures, ―brokerage‖ and ―betweenness‖ offer different ways of ―indexing just how ‗central‘ or 
‗powerful‘ ego is within their own neighborhood,‖ and structural holes offer a way of measuring structural 
inequalities (Hanneman and Riddle 2005, chap. 9). ―Reach‖ is dropped because these ego networks are not extracted 
from a larger, complete network. Rather, they are collected individually. However, if a sufficient number of ego 
networks were collected so that a full network could be generated from the aggregation of the personal cases, then 
this calculation could be examined. 
Additionally, there are no weak components, or rather, ego is imbedded in a single weak component. That 
is, there are no groups of alters for which ego is the only connection to other alters. For this reason, UCINET reports 
―1‖ for this variable. Given the single component for each of network, normalizing by network size is not done 
(normalizing "is a pretty meaningless exercise" if there are no cases of multiple components among the examined 
networks, see, e.g., Hanneman and Riddle 2005, chap. 9). A more detailed analysis of Gould and Fernandez 
brokerage roles is possible (i.e., coordinator, consultant, gatekeeper, etc.), but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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magistrado, 0 if first-instance juez). I anticipate that income and position capture seniority, 
which should also have a negative relationship with attitude. 
Ultimately, the opinions of alters establish the composition of ego‘s network, and the 
remaining questions establish the structure of each personal network. Figure 1 visualizes two of 
these ego networks—one with many alters and ties among alters and one with few alters and ties 
among them—which also convey the structural inequalities described above.12 In Figure 1, node 
size varies according to degree and the width of edges between nodes varies according to tie 
strength. By definition of the ego network, the ego is connected to all alters, so the ego node and 
all ego-alter ties are in light grey in the background. Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics for 
ego‘s attitude on four issues, network composition on these issues (alters‘ mean attitude), ego‘s 
demographic characteristics, and structural features of personal network. 
 
Figure 1. Illustrations of Ego Networks 
 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                          
12
 Visualizations generated in UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 1999). 
ego1
alter1
alter2
alter3
alter4
alter5
ego5
alter1
alter2
alter3
alter4
alter5
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Next, I aggregate the egocentric data to generate socio-network data. Given that the 
survey targeted all judges in the state, it is reasonable to conclude that some of these judges will 
be listing each other as alters. For instance, in the figure above, ego1‘s alter5 may be ego5‘s 
alter4, or even ego5 herself; thus, we get a fuller sense of the structure of social relations 
between these two judges by finding the ways in which their social structure overlaps. Doing this 
for all respondents aggregates ego networks according to alter-alter matches or ego-alter 
matches, resulting in a whole network of 113 judges in the state of Michoacán.
13
 Thus, for all 
practical purposes, we have a full network of all judges. The attitudes of judges who did not 
participate in the survey are established by averaging the responses provided by participants 
(recall that all participants provided their own opinions in the first part of the survey and then 
provided an estimate of their alters‘ opinions in the name interpreter battery). After removing 
isolates and a number of observations that were missing data, the full network consists of 102 
nodes with varying demographic and attitudinal characteristics and 290 edges of varying 
strength. The 102 nodes constitute 92.73 percent of the 110 on the official directory of judges. In 
addition to the full network of all state judges, these aggregated data include 18 of 19 
magistrados on the state supreme court (94.64 percent complete), and 47 of the 49 judges (95.92 
percent complete) in the judicial district of the capital, Morelia (including magistrados, who are 
based there). Though a purist would consider these networks to be technically incomplete, they 
are very nearly complete, and existing research includes examples of sociocentric analysis on 
                                                          
13
 113 is more than the 110 judges listed on the official directory of  the judiciary, but this directory does not account 
for recent personnel changes: indeed, the consultant who administered the survey noted that the interviewer was 
turned away from several courts because a judge had either been reassigned or no judge had yet been assigned to the 
court; in other cases, a new judge not yet on the official roster/directory was already there and completed the 
questionnaire. 
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networks ranging in completeness from 65.3 percent to 77.7 percent (e.g., Berardo 2011, 69). 
Thus, beyond the egocentric networks above, the aggregation process yields three different 
sociocentric networks based on three distinct boundaries in increasing order of size: state 
supreme court, judicial district of Morelia, and state. Figure 2 visualizes the largest of these 
networks, which is also the target of analysis in the quantitative section below. Node size is 
based on number of ties (degree centrality); edge color reflects tie strength (strongest in black); 
and node color reflects attitude towards judicial councils (low to high passing from blue, through 
yellow, to red).
14
 Table 3 summarizes statistics for this sociocentric network. 
Figure 2. Full network of judges in Michoacán 
 
                                                          
14
 Whole network visualizations generated using Cytoscape 2.8.2 (Smoot et al. 2011). 
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In the sociocentric analysis of the network represented in Figure 2, the key explanatory 
variable is the mean value of the attitude of each of a node‘s neighbors. Additional explanatory 
variables operationalize centrality in the overall network, homophily, and context. The analysis 
includes four measures of centrality: degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. 
The entire network is treated as undirected, so all incoming and outgoing ties are treated equally. 
Measures of centrality are based on this undirected network, and all measures were generated in 
UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 1999). 
 
Results 1: Egocentric Networks 
Given the ordinal dependent variable (ego‘s attitude), I applied ordered probabilistic regressions 
to the egocentric data. The main explanatory variable is the mean value of the attitude among the 
ego‘s alters, capturing the attitudinal composition of the network. This model approximates what 
Valente (1995, 43–45) called a ―personal network exposure‖ model of diffusion.  
Focusing on attitudes towards judicial councils, the partial correlation between ego‘s 
attitude and alters‘ mean attitude is 0.68 (p<0.01). Table 4 summarizes the regression results.15 
  
                                                          
15
 Ordered logistic regressions must meet the parallel regression assumption, also called the probabilistic odds 
assumption. That is, ordered probit (and logit) assume that the effect of the explanatory variables (X) across all 
levels of the response variable (Y) is the same, i.e., the size of the coefficients does not change for different values 
of Y. A likelihood ratio test implemented at the bottom of each column shows whether the analysis meets that 
assumption. Test was implemented using omodel in Stata v.11. See also Dow (2008, 407) and Stata Data Analysis 
Examples: Ordered Logistic Regression, UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group. 
Available at: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_ologit_output.htm  (last accessed February 23, 2012). 
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Table 4. Personal networks; ordered probabilistic regression 
y = attitudes towards judicial councils (1–5) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Alters‘ mean(y) 
 
 
0.92** 
(0.16) 
 
1.41** 
(0.36) 
 
0.98** 
(0.21) 
 
1.04** 
(0.21) 
 
1.01** 
(0.20) 
Size  –0.09 
(0.23) 
–0.01 
(0.15) 
–0.03 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
Density  0.83 
(1.18) 
0.18 
(0.85) 
0.53 
(0.87) 
0.03 
(0.83) 
Tie strength (mean) 
 
 –0.01 
(0.27) 
0.42* 
(0.18) 
0.41* 
(0.19) 
0.46* 
(0.18) 
Left  0.32 
(0.65) 
   
Right  –0.00 
(0.54) 
   
Progressive 
 
  0.07 
(0.14) 
0.11 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.14) 
Education 
 
 0.20 
(0.29) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.08 
(0.20) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
Female 
 
 –0.14 
(0.38) 
–0.20 
(0.38) 
0.03 
(0.39) 
0.22 
(0.38) 
Age 
 
 –0.02 
(0.02) 
–0.02 
(0.02) 
  
Salary 
 
   –0.22 
(0.15) 
 
Magistrado 
 
    –0.24 
(0.49) 
District (Morelia)  0.57 
(0.52) 
0.38 
(0.34) 
0.36 
(0.39) 
0.39 
(0.36) 
Number of obs  78 45 78 76 78 
LR chi2(4)  33.20 40.91 42.93 48.86 42.26 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.1918 0.3805 0.2481 0.2929 .2442 
Test of parallel regression 
assumption (should not be 
significant): 
 
chi2(12)  1.37 32.13 16.76 31.44 25.99 
Prob>chi2  0.71 0.46 0.94 0.25 0.52 
** p<.01 *p<.05      
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The key predictor—alter‘s mean(y)—has the expected positive relationship with ego‘s attitude, 
and this result is statistically significant. Similarly, mean tie strength has a positive and 
statistically significant relationship. These core results hold while controlling for other aspects of 
network structure, demographic variables, and judicial district, none of which are significant. 
Indeed, the substantive effect of alters‘ attitudes increases as the controls are added.16 
Figure 3 clarifies the substantive significance of the main result. Based on Model 5, each 
plot graphs the predicted probability of each outcome (1–5) sequentially against alters‘ mean 
attitude, shading the area between the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence 
interval.
17
 The probability of the lowest attitude (y=1) is highest where alters‘ mean attitude is at 
its lowest; in this instance, there is about a 87 percent likelihood that ego‘s attitude has the lowest 
value if alters‘ mean is at its lowest value (Pr(y|x)=Pr(1|1)=.87), and this likelihood declines 
rapidly as alters‘ attitude increases. Conversely, there is approximately a 90 percent likelihood of 
the highest outcome (y=5) if mean(y) is also at its highest value. This likelihood drops 
precipitously if mean(y) decreases, to 60 percent if mean(y)=4, and to only 20 percent if 
mean(y)=3. In short, a judge‘s attitude towards judicial councils is shaped by his or her 
                                                          
16
 Age, salary, and position (magistrado dummy) are theoretically capturing similar dynamics, and magistrado and 
salary are empirically correlated (0.66), so they are not included in the same model. Still, including (1) age and 
magistrado or (2) age and salary in the same model did not alter core results. 
17
 There is no simple, straightforward method for interpreting substantive effect in ordered probabilistic regressions 
(Dow 2008). However, graphing the results offers one of the more intuitive ways of conveying substantive 
significance. Predicted probabilities were generated using margins and prgen commands in Stata v.11 and setting 
other variables at their means, and graphs by using the rarea option. See Long and Freese (2006); Stata Annotated 
Output Ordered Logistic Regression. UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group. 
Available at: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_ologit_output.htm (last accessed November 26, 2011). 
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colleagues‘ attitudes towards councils. Taken in combination with the finding regarding tie 
strength, this is systematic, empirical support for the proposition that intense interaction, a la 
Ferree and Miller (1977), promotes ideational diffusion. Contrast with Woods‘s (2008) 
proposition that diffuse connections characterize ―judicial communities‖ that generate ideational 
consensus; though the role of ―weak ties‖ inherent in her account is not directly tested here, the 
positive and significant effect of tie strength cuts against that argument. 
Figure 3. Predicted probability of ego’s attitude by alters’ mean attitude 
 
Results for other attitudes, including the criminal procedure reform of 2008, and jurisprudential 
attitudes—positivism and deference to higher courts—are in the online appendix. In each 
analysis, mean attitude among alters maintains its positive and statistically significant 
relationship with ego‘s attitude on the same issue. Further, it is worth noting that higher 
education levels have a negative and statistically significant relationship with positivism. That is, 
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the traditionally formalistic, technical-legal approach to judging may be losing strength as more 
and more judges obtain graduate degrees. 
 
Results 2: Sociocentric Analysis 
Moving to the whole network data, Table 5 reports the regression results for attitudes regarding 
the judicial council. The key variable of interest—the mean attitude of all contacts one step away 
from each judge—has a positive coefficient across all models, providing general  
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Table 5. Whole network; ordered probabilistic regression 
y = attitudes towards judicial councils (1–5) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Mean(y) for one-step alters 
 
 
0.43** 
(0.14) 
 
0.47** 
(0.14) 
 
0.46** 
(0.14) 
 
0.35** 
(0.15) 
 
0.48** 
(0.14) 
 
0.42** 
(0.15) 
Degree  –0.05 
(0.05) 
   
 
0.03 
(0.05) 
Betweenness   0.00 
(0.00) 
  
 
 
Closeness 
 
   0.00 
(0.00) 
  
Eigenvector 
 
    3.66 
(2.63) 
 
Female 
 
    
 
 
 
–0.36 
(0.26) 
Magistrado 
 
    
 
 –0.40 
(0.37) 
Morelia
18
 
 
     –0.21 
(0.28) 
Number of obs  102 102 102 102 102 102 
LR chi2(4)  11.98 12.93 14.38 15.49 14.00 16.75 
Prob > chi2  0.0025 0.0048 0.0024 0.0014 0.0029 0.0102 
Pseudo R2  0.0514 0.0554 0.0616 .0664 .0600 0.0718 
Test of parallel regression assumption (should not be significant): 
chi2(12)  2.48 4.50 4.26 2.92 3.48 18.96 
Prob>chi2  0.87 0.88 0.89 0.97 0.94 0.3945 
** p<.01 * p<.05       
 
support for the proposition that a judge‘s attitude towards council reform increases as the attitude 
towards said reform increases among a judge‘s close colleagues. This result is also statistically 
                                                          
18
 There are twenty-three judicial districts in the state. Initially, twenty-one dummies captured the districts 
individually (two districts were unrepresented in the data). However, only one district had any significance 
(Zinapecuaro) relating to a single judge, and there were no meaningful departures from the results here. Judicial 
districts were then collapsed into three categories: Morelia, west of Morelia, and east of Morelia. Again, there were 
no meaningful differences compared with the results here. 
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significant across all models. Indeed, even controlling for various measures of centrality, 
homophily, and context, the result regarding direct contact remains.  
It should be noted, however, that the analysis reported in Table 5 was conducted with 
network weights based on a valued adjacency matrix (W2). Additional analysis with a simple 
binary adjacency matrix (W1) yielded no statistically significant results (findings not reported 
here). Stated otherwise, the mere presence of a direct relation between ego and alter is not 
sufficient to influence ego‘s attitude; rather, the influence of direct relations is contingent on the 
strength or intensity of that relation. Thus, the sociocentric analysis generates no support for H2 
but strong support for H3. The findings clearly complement the findings from the egocentric 
analysis, where both alters‘ mean attitude and tie strength mattered.  
Turning to the other variables, none of the centrality measures have a statistically 
significant relationship with the respondent‘s attitude, so there is no support for H1. Therefore, 
the results support the conclusion that general social location (captured by centrality), in and of 
itself, matters less than the strength of direct relations. Measures of homophily (sex and position) 
are not consistently significant, but in several alternative specifications (not reported here), 
female has a negative relationship at the .10 level of significance. For instance, controlling for 
closeness centrality, judicial district, and position, female exerts a negative effect (p=0.08). 
Further, in all auxiliary models the coefficient for magistrado has a negative sign. Both of these 
results complement the findings from the egocentric analysis in the previous section. 
Clarifying further, Figure 4 graphs predicted probabilities across response categories, 
setting the remaining variables at their means. As was the case with the prior egocentric analysis, 
each graph plots the predicted probability of each outcome (1–5; y-axis) against alters‘ mean 
attitude, weighted by the valued adjacency matrix (x-axis). 
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Figure 4. Predicted probability of ego’s attitude as a function of alters’ mean attitude 
 
Two patterns should be highlighted from these graphs. First, the slope of the probability curves 
in the graphs supports the expected relationships. Specifically, in the first graph, it is more likely 
that ego will hold the most negative attitude towards judicial councils if her peers hold a negative 
attitude. Conversely, in the last graph, it is dramatically more likely that a judge will hold the 
most positive attitude towards judicial councils if her peers hold a positive attitude than if they 
hold the most negative attitude. Second, however, the relationship is only clearly significant for 
the highest value of the outcome variable. Thus, the evidence is still complementary of the 
egocentric analysis, but only for the highest value of the outcome variable. 
 As a robustness check I applied a linear network autocorrelation model (Butts 2008).
19
 
Linear network autocorrelation is not exactly appropriate given the ordinal response variable. 
                                                          
19
 Following Butts (2008), I employed lnam using the sna package in R. 
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Nonetheless, linear models generally yield robust results with ordinal variables, and results 
should at least be instructive. Various specifications of the network effects model (Butts 2008; 
Dow 2007) yielded results that were supportive of the core finding  that social interaction, 
especially intense interaction, shapes one's attitudes (results not reported here). Indeed, the 
findings were statistically more significant than the 2SCML methods detailed above, suggesting 
that the core results from the 2SCML reported in full above are the most conservative. 
 In sum, quantitative analyses of network diffusion for ego- and sociocentric data 
complement each other in showing that two factors influence ego‘s attitude: (1) alters‘ mean 
attitude, and (2) the strength of ties, i.e., the intensity of interactions.  
 
Results 3: Qualitative Network Analysis 
Triangulating further, qualitative methods yield additional insights regarding the core findings of 
the causal role of intense interaction from the quantitative analysis above and elucidate 
mechanisms of diffusion. The substantive part of the analysis addresses two issues—(1) external 
validity of network structure, and (2) validity of causal inferences—and draws on a set of five 
personal, in-depth interviews with judges who participated in the survey generating the network 
data above. These judges are nodes 313, 2174, 2690, 3646, and 4635 in Figure 2.  
Table 6 summarizes features of the interview sample. First, these five judges constitute 
low-residual observations, as evidenced by their ―typicality‖ scores.20 All of the interview 
participants are in the top half of typicality scores, and two of them are in the top 10 percent. 
                                                          
20
 I follow Gerring and Seawright (2007) in calculating the absolute value of residuals, but given the ordinal level of 
measurement there is not as much variation in typicality. Therefore, I rank observations within each category by the 
predicted probability of the outcome, in essence yielding typicality scores ranked by the ―confidence‖ in that 
typicality score. 
 30 
 
Thus, these are promising observations in which we might expect to find additional evidence of 
the central argument (Lieberman 2005). All observations are central according to various 
network measures. Further, the sample consists of four men and one woman, two judges from the 
interior of the state and three magistrados from the state capital, Morelia. 
Table 6. Features of interviewees 
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313 8 4.6 3 4 1 1 M Juez N 
2174 18 5.0 2 1 2 3 F Mag Y 
2690 39 4.3 33 47 37 16 M Mag Y 
3646 25 4.7 7 11 7 6 M Mag Y 
4635 9 4.7 1 2 4 2 M Juez N 
 
In January 2012, six months after the administration of the survey, these judges were 
reminded of the questionnaire and shown a visualization of the judicial network for the full state 
as well as a visualization of the network for the state supreme court. They were then asked to 
focus on two questions: (1) whether the network structure reflected their own mental image of 
social relations among judges (external validity), and (2) what meaning they themselves 
attributed to those ties and the network structure now visualized. 
Regarding external validity, 2174, 2690, and 3646—all magistrados—immediately 
recognized the visualization of the STJ network as a fair representation of a split between 
primarily two groups of judges—a core group of more progressive judges spearheading changes 
in institutional design and jurisprudence. Each of these judges also spontaneously volunteered 
his or her guesses about which magistrados were part of the core group and which were more 
peripheral; a clear majority of these guesses were correct. Thus, the transition from questionnaire 
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to network visualization appears to faithfully reproduce social structures that members of the 
court recognize in their daily interactions.  
Beyond external validity, 2690 acknowledged that the individuals he listed as contacts in 
his discussion group are people he considers influential for his own way of thinking. He 
explicitly stated that these contacts shape the way he thinks about the law, legal conflicts, and 
institutional design. For instance, he noted an example in which he called one of his principal 
contacts, 1660, now retired and not included in the network, to discuss a particular legal matter 
and how the conversation with 1660 changed his perspective on the topic.  
Similarly, 2174 noted that she feels influenced by those individuals with whom she is in 
contact. Asked specifically whether the people with whom she interacts most frequently—her 
judicial discussion group—shaped her attitudes and ideas, she affirmed that this was the case. 
Over time and sustained interactions, she said, this group has come to have similar ideas. Pressed 
to give examples of this sort of phenomenon, 2174 noted that she relies on her discussion group 
contacts—and her contacts rely on her—for information and advice regarding novel legal issues 
that arise in cases and insights regarding institutional conflicts and political conflicts outside the 
judiciary that might affect the institution. For instance, regarding jurisprudential issues, 2174 
recalled a conversation with one of her contacts in which she came to understand a particular 
legal concept from a different perspective. That is, judges might share entirely new legal 
concepts with each other, but they might also come to understand existing legal concepts from an 
entirely new vantage point. 
Judges 313 and 4635 clarified this dynamic further. Both named 3646 as very influential 
in the way they think about both judicial councils and criminal procedure. Both also named 2714 
as influential in the way they think about responsibility in criminal law. They mentioned the 
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concepts of ―dolo‖ and ―culpa‖—both of which are used to establish different degrees of 
culpability, or elements of ―mens rea‖ in criminal offenses. These concepts generally have very 
strict and inflexible interpretations in Mexican law, but due to interactions with 2174 both judges 
came to adopt a more flexible interpretation of these concepts, particularly variations of ―dolo.‖21  
Asked specifically whether they interacted frequently with 3646, 2174, or their other 
named contact due to shared ideas or whether they held similar ideas because of the frequency of 
interactions, both affirmed the latter. For instance, both 313 and 4635 were students of 3646 in 
law school, though in separate years, so they were exposed to 3646‘s ideas in academic settings 
and came to hold similar attitudes regarding legal issues. Further, they have both matured 
professionally under the mentorship of 2174, first working for her and then interacting with her 
as they ascended through different positions and district posts. The early professional contact 
with 2174 set the stage for sustained interaction over time, and both 313 and 4635 said they have 
come to adopt some of her ideas (e.g., regarding dolo, as noted above).  
Separately, 313 and 4635 said they have both worked, at different times, in some of the 
most difficult districts in the state, including those districts where organized crime has a strong 
presence (e.g., Lázaro Cárdenas and Apatzingán). While judges in these districts, they faced 
bribe attempts and complex legal cases and also had to coexist alongside witnesses, victims, and 
offenders in communities heavily populated with individuals connected to organized crime. They 
were able to successfully navigate these challenges, and as a result colleagues seek them out for 
                                                          
21
 ―Dolo‖ is equivalent to deliberate criminal intent—intending to commit or allow an act to be committed knowing 
(or acknowledging the possibility) that said act is criminal—while ―culpa‖ is equivalent to criminal negligence—
unintentionally committing a crime out of recklessness or carelessness (see Zamora et al. 2004, 352–53).  
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advice when faced with similar situations. This, they said, may account for their prominence in 
the network. 
In sum, the interview evidence supports the network influence finding from the statistical 
analysis, adding context and depth regarding certain structural features of the network. Further, 
regarding mechanisms of diffusion, interviews identified academic and professional mentorship 
relations as mechanisms underlying the diffusion profession. Indeed, since most judges in 
Michoacán come from the state‘s main public law school (following a pattern seen across the 
Mexican states), professors in these institutions who are concurrently or subsequently also judges 
may be particularly influential. This insight resonates with Katz et al.‘s (2011) findings regarding 
the ―infectiousness of ideas‖ among law professors and clerks. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
The project makes three core contributions. First, I contribute original data based on a survey of 
these judges. These data cover a wide range of judicial attitudes, as well as structural properties 
of judicial networks. The data demonstrate that network-oriented research with original surveys 
is feasible with ―hard-to-reach‖ populations such as judges in less developed settings, even 
where there are substantial security considerations. Second, the network batteries of the survey 
yield egocentric data, and these egocentric data can be aggregated to form sociocentric data at 
three levels of analysis: judicial district, state supreme court, and entire state. Finally, a mixed-
methods causal analysis—combining two forms of quantitative analysis in addition to in-depth 
interviews—yields consistent findings regarding the diffusion of ideas across judicial networks.  
 Concretely, I find that ideas diffuse among judges who are in intense interaction with 
each other. This finding is supported by analysis of egocentric data, showing that the mean 
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attitude of a judge‘s close contacts shapes that judge‘s own attitudes and that the strength of ties 
also contributes to ego‘s attitude. Aggregating the egocentric data to form sociocentric data at the 
level of the entire state and applying different techniques, I find complementary evidence that 
strong, direct interaction with one‘s colleagues shapes judges‘ attitudes. These findings hold 
while controlling for a range of other network variables, demographic characteristics, and 
context. 
In the future, this project aims to expand to other states and countries in order to gather 
additional data on judicial networks, test the generalizability of arguments, and measure different 
kinds of legal networks. Whether the findings reported here hold across different policy areas—
institutional and jurisprudential—is also a question of major interest. Additional research 
questions regarding tie formation and tie degradation offer compelling prospects for the future. 
Overall, the findings are broadly suggestive of a relationship between structure and 
agency. If social structure has a powerful influence over ideas and behavior, then agency may 
not always be a fully conscious, deliberative phenomenon, as work on ―satisficing‖ and mental 
shortcuts has suggested (Simon 1985).
22
 Nonconscious influences have deep implications for the 
nature of the relationship between structure and agency across multiple arenas, including 
rationalist, decision-theoretic approaches to behavior. Beyond cognitive shortcuts, however, our 
individual decisions are not independent of other individuals; they are imbedded in a dependent 
web of relations. Thus, what appears to be an individualistic, conscious decision may in fact be 
                                                          
22
 The debate over conscious and nonconscious cognitive processes also has roots in the social movements literature. 
For instance, the framing of ideas, identities, or other nonmaterial reasons for joining a movement may be 
nonconscious or not fully formed consciously at early movement stages; however, once the movement is 
established, framing and messaging become much more conscious and strategic (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 
1996, 6, 16). 
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the result of the nonconscious influence of social structure. Put simply if crudely, whom we 
know affects what we know, and without us even knowing it! 
On a more practical level, the findings have concrete policy implications for the judicial 
leadership in states like Michoacán. Trainings and other fora where judges can interact and share 
ideas are ripe environments in which to bring judges in contact with new ideas or expose judges, 
clerks, and other staff to new ways of thinking. Judicial leaders have great control over who is 
invited to speak at these events. Perhaps more importantly, judicial leaders have control over 
how frequently and intensely judges interact in these events. For instance, are these events 
lectures or more interactive, engaging kinds of activities? Beyond trainings and formal settings, 
how do judges interact informally, perhaps even outside the workplace? Are there smaller 
settings or activities in which judges can be selectively invited to exchange ideas with judicial 
leaders, academics, or even prominent judges from other jurisdictions? Can judges be 
encouraged to attend particular conferences or workshops? Also, can judicial leaders leverage 
information on the centrality of individual colleagues to affect the flow and diffusion of ideas, 
inviting very central individuals to small-group sessions on new or proposed reforms or, 
conversely, inviting peripheral individuals to larger sessions or sessions led by more central 
individuals? Answers to each of these questions will depend on local conditions and capabilities, 
but these are the kinds of policy implications that flow from the results.  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Egocentric Data 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Ego Attitudes 
Judicial Councils 78 4.24 1.20 1 5 
Criminal Procedure 71 3.97 1.19 1 5 
Same Sex Marriage 78 3.36 1.64 1 5 
Deference to Higher Courts 78 3.58 1.62 1 5 
Positivism 78 4.08 1.10 1 5 
Military Jurisdiction 78 2.58 1.51 1 5 
Network Composition (mean alter attitude) 
Judicial Councils 78 4.25 0.91 1.67 5 
Criminal Procedure 76 4.12 0.87 2 5 
Same Sex Marriage 74 2.96 1.38 1 5 
Deference to Higher Courts 76 3.54 1.37 1 5 
Positivism 76 3.95 1.01 1 5 
Military Jurisdiction 74 2.73 1.25 1 5 
Network Structure 
Size 78 2.81 1.15 1 5 
Density 78 0.37 0.20 0 50 
closeness (mean tie strength) 78 3.99 0.87 1 5 
Ego Demographic Data 
Progressive  78 6.10 1.03 2 7 
Education (highest level) 78 2.47 0.80 1 3 
Female 78 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Age 78 44.18 7.42 32 62 
Salary 76 4.78 1.31 2 7 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Sociocentric Data 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Ego Attitude (Judicial Councils) 102 4.22 1.16 1 5 
Network Weighted Mean 102 3.13 0.93 0.80 5.00 
Female 102 0.31 0.47 0 1 
Magistrado 102 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Morelia 102 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Degree 102 5.18 3.67 1 17 
Betweenness 102 100.30 172.04 0.00 748.39 
Closeness 102 1744 2292 1030 10202 
Eigenvector 102 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.30 
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Appendix A. 
Social network analysis examines either whole networks or personal networks. Each 
approach has its strengths and weaknesses. Whole networks include a full set of relational ties 
provided or reported by each member of the network. In generating original survey-based data, 
this high information requirement means the survey sample must consist of the full population of 
the network. A weakness of this approach is that the boundary is almost always set arbitrarily, so 
relations beyond this arbitrary boundary are left out. For instance, a ―whole‖ classroom network 
is imbedded within a larger school network, but the data collection strategy treats these other 
relations as absent. Another weakness is that gathering data on all relational ties becomes 
increasingly difficult as network size increases; thus, this approach is infeasible with networks 
larger than approximately a hundred members.  
In personal networks, all the information about the network comes from the ego; that is, 
the ego reports her or his own opinions and identifies the people with whom she or he interacts. 
This information provides the size of the personal network, and the ego then reports on the 
characteristics of alters, the quality of the ego‘s tie with each alter, and on ties among alters. The 
accuracy of the ego‘s responses regarding alters and alter-alter relations is not that important; 
since the analysis examines the influence of the network on the ego at its center, ego‘s subjective 
perception of the qualities of alters and of their relations matters more than objective accuracy 
(Sinclair in Fowler et al. 2011). Strengths of this method include the ease of implementation in 
survey analysis (network batteries) or interviews. Weaknesses include the fact each personal 
network is almost certainly larger than any survey could capture, so relevant ties may be lost, and 
the ego network cannot be studied as part of a broader society. Table 1 summarize the trade-offs 
between these two approaches. 
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Table 1. Trade-offs between ego- and sociocentric data 
 Ego Socio 
Strengths Easier to collect own data from 
medium-sized and large 
populations 
 
Can see broader group or 
society 
Statistical analysis is more 
straightforward 
 
Can estimate network features 
and effects across broader 
group/society 
Weaknesses Lack sense of connectedness 
within broader group or society 
 
Sampling may not yield 
independent observations 
(always true to at least some 
degree, especially if take idea of 
―small worlds‖ seriously) 
Harder to collect original 
personal data 
 
Network boundary can be 
arbitrary—not clear that it 
corresponds with reality; i.e., 
cannot see others who might 
exert influence 
 
Statistical analysis is more 
difficult 
 
